The aid budget fell by half. The need did not.
Humanitarian funding roughly halved in a year while 239 million people were assessed as needing help. Nothing new is coming to close that gap, which leaves one question: can the same money reach more people? We took a settlement the size of a city, rebuilt one monsoon season from published standards and public figures, and asked what changes if the plan is solved rather than argued.
Half the money. The same number of people.
In a single year, US official development assistance fell from about $63 billion to under $29 billion. The UN's 2025 appeal took in $12 billion, the lowest in a decade, and twenty-five million fewer people were reached than the year before.
The sector's own response is triage, and it is stated in the open: 239 million people in need, 135 million targeted, 87 million "hyper-prioritized." That framing is not ours. But it does define the problem precisely. When the budget is fixed and the need is not, the only remaining lever is how well each dollar is placed.
A map, a spreadsheet, and a room.
Deciding where a camp's water points, latrines and tubewells go is, today, a workshop. Local knowledge, a printed map, whatever land is available, and whoever argues hardest. The output is a list of sites with no coverage number attached, which means the argument has no arithmetic in it.
This is not negligence — it is the absence of a tool. The people in that room are the best-informed people in the country. They are working without the one thing that would settle the question, and without a number they can defend line by line to a donor — which, this year, is the conversation.
The standards are already the constraints.
Humanitarian response has a published rulebook. The Sphere standards are not aspirations; they are numbers, and every one of them is a constraint a solver can read:
15 litres per person per day
no household further than 500 m from a water point
no more than 15 minutes at the tap
no more than 250 people per tapstand
no more than 20 people per toilet, within 50 m
3.5 m² of covered space per person
That makes siting a coverage problem with a budget, not a workshop. Pick the set of positions that brings the most households inside those numbers for the money available. It is the same shape of problem as placing charging infrastructure across a province, which is a solver we have already built and run.
Cox's Bazar, one monsoon.
A million people across thirty-three camps on erodible hills — the most densely populated refugee settlement on earth. 152,000 people arrived after late 2023, against a response plan written for 50,000. In one week of July 2026: 286 weather incidents, 95 landslides, 26,119 people affected.
We gave the solver 180 candidate positions, four asset classes and a $2.0 million ceiling, and asked it for a site plan. It returned nine positions — and left $150,000 unspent, on purpose, because the ninth dollar of the last site bought less coverage than leaving it in the envelope. Every line carries what it serves, what it costs, and the Sphere clause it satisfies.
People move toward what you built.
Standard planning treats where people live as a fixed input, solves against it, and is wrong by the second month. Put in a water point and the settlement shifts toward it — the plan changes the thing the plan was solved against.So we don't sample three thousand random draws. We simulate three behaviours, each a household making a rational choice:
152,000 people arrived after late 2023 against a response plan written for 50,000. New households fill the gaps between blocks, which is where the plan assumed nobody was.
Every household takes the closest water point, so queues form where the model never put them, and a tapstand costed for 250 people ends up serving far more.
4,307 shelters already sit on erodible gradient. A plan that succeeds at drawing people in pushes the next arrivals onto exactly the ridge that fails in July.
Run those three forward nine weeks against the plan just solved and the gap stops being a worry and becomes a coordinate: 1,340 households beyond 500 m by week nine. You now know where the plan breaks, in April, in a model — rather than in July, in a monsoon.
Same settlement. Same season. Same ceiling.
Nothing differs between these two columns except how the positions were chosen. Not the terrain, not the population, not a single extra dollar.
4,822 more people reached in a single week of response,for less money than the plan it replaces. Not because anything was added, but because a single-modality response runs out of envelope at person 21,297 — and cash where markets work, in-kind and road where they don't, air only where nothing else reaches, is an assignment problem with a right answer.
Before the season, during it, and after a loss.
One budget, three moments where it is committed — and they are three different problems, in this order:
Where the sites go, decided against the standards and the terrain rather than the room. This is the site plan, and it is the one that has to survive a funding conversation.
Which modality reaches which caseload while the week is happening: cash, in-kind, road, air. One envelope, assigned by cost-to-reach instead of by habit.
What moves when a slope fails at 3 a.m. Drop what's lost, re-weight what survives, re-solve in seconds — because a blocked path just made one surviving tapstand serve 900 people against a standard of 250.
Optimized by math. Pressure-tested by simulation.
Terrain, block-level population and the published standards become one question with a number attached: given this ceiling, where do the water points go?
A weighted set-cover program picks 9 positions from 180 candidates across four asset classes, maximizing households brought inside the standard per dollar. An exact solver, not a model guessing — the same inputs give the same plan, and every line cites the clause it satisfies.
The plan is run forward nine weeks against agents that arrive, walk to the nearest tap, and build uphill. The gap it opens has a number and a location: 1,340 households beyond 500 m by week nine.
A slope goes at 3 a.m. and three water points are gone. Drop them, re-weight what survives, re-solve: three nodes changed, 4.2 seconds. Nobody re-plans a camp from scratch for week ten.
Where the AI is, and where it isn't. The site plan is never written by a language model. AI does two jobs at the edges: it builds the optimization model, translating an operation into an objective and constraints you can read in plain language, and it attacks the result with agentic simulation. The decision in the middle is made by an exact solver — deterministic, auditable, and defensible clause by clause.
Built to be checked — and to be wrong.
Every context figure below is public. Every solver figure is model output on synthetic data, and we would rather be corrected on it than quoted on it.
OECD preliminary 2025 ODA; UN OCHA Global Humanitarian Overview 2026 (December 2025). US official development assistance fell from roughly $63B to under $29B in a single year; the 2025 appeal took in $12B, the lowest in a decade.
239M people assessed as in need; 135M targeted at $33B; 87M "hyper-prioritized" at $23B. 27.8% of the 2025 appeal was funded. The prioritization is the sector's own, not ours.
Cox's Bazar: ~1,000,000 people across 33 camps and 2,704 blocks (UNHCR, IOM DTM). 4–9 July 2026: 286 weather incidents, 95 landslides, 26,119 people affected, 2,809 shelters damaged (Human Rights Watch, July 2026).
Sphere Handbook 2018, 4th edition, and the UNHCR Emergency Handbook. These are published, numeric and binding — which is what makes them usable as solver constraints.
Weighted set cover over 180 candidate positions, four asset classes, a $2.0M ceiling. Simulation: three behaviours over 21 household paths, nine weeks. Modality efficiency from CALP Network (2026) and an ODI four-country study; settlement-drift evidence from the Migration Policy Centre.
Ourus has not worked in Cox's Bazar. The settlement geometry, costs, coverage figures and re-solve results are model output on synthetic data, not operational data from any organisation. Context figures are published and cited above.
Not a demo. A dataset.
We are two engineers in Toronto and neither of us has run a camp. What we have is a set-cover solver that placed charging infrastructure for the Ontario Ministry of Transportation, and a simulation that treats a population as something that moves. Give us one camp, one season of data, and the plan you already wrote — and let us show you where we are wrong.
An illustrative reconstruction. Ourus has not worked in Cox's Bazar. Settlement geometry, costs, coverage figures and re-solve results are model output on synthetic data, not operational data from any organisation. Context figures — population, incident counts, funding levels and Sphere standards — are from the published sources cited above.
Have a decision like this?
We take on a small number of design partners. Bring the plan you are afraid to run.